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Not-So-Secret Secrets? The State of the Attorney-Client
Privilege in North Carolina in the Wake of In re Investigation
of Death of Eric Miller and Crawford v. Washington
The murder of Dr. Eric Miller in December 2000 had the
makings of the type of legal drama that interests the media and
excites the public.' Eric Miller, a young research doctor and father to
his infant daughter Clare, died as a result of arsenic poisoning.2
Police suspected that his wife, Ann Miller Kontz,3 and her lover,
Derril Willard, were involved in his death.' The suspense heightened
when Willard committed suicide.' Within months it became clear that
the real legal drama would spring not from the circumstances
surrounding Miller's death, but from an attorney's fight to keep the
contents of a client consultation secret.6 With Kontz refusing to
cooperate with the investigation and Willard having taken his own life
within weeks of Miller's death, prosecutors focused their attention on
the attorney Willard consulted prior to his suicide: Rick Gammon.7
1. For a sample of newspaper accounts of the investigation, see Oren Dorell, Arsenic
Case Hinges on Circumstantial Evidence, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 27,
2001, at Al; Oren Dorell, Police Probe Unusual Death, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Dec. 4, 2000, at Bi; Oren Dorell, Toxic Compound Is Seized, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 13, 2000, at B3; Oren Dorell, Warrant Issued in Arsenic Probe, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 22, 2001, at 1; Eric Ferreri, Raleigh Police Are
Investigating Death of Young UNC Researcher; Traces of Arsenic Found in Man's System,
but Officials Doubt Occupational Exposure, CHAPEL HILL HERALD (Durham, N.C.),
Dec. 8, 2000, at 1; Craig Jarvis & Oren Dorell, Lives Intersect in Tragedy, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 11, 2001, at Al; Thomasi McDonald, Cops Seize
Computer in Arsenic Death, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 24, 2000, at B5; Jay
Price et al., Man Linked to Poisoning Kills Himself, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Jan. 23, 2001, at Al; Jay Price & Oren Dorell, Widow Gets Legal Help, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 24, 2001, at B1; Beth Velliquette, Postdoc's Death Still a
Mystery, CHAPEL HILL HERALD (Durham, N.C.), Dec. 14, 2000, at 1; Andrea Weigl,
N&O Sues To Unseal Autopsy Report, a Public Document, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Feb. 17, 2001, at B3.
2. Dorell, Arsenic Case Hinges on Circumstantial Evidence, supra note 1.
3. In November 2003, Ann Miller married Paul Martin Kontz. Brooke Cain, The
Case So Far: Timeline of the Death of Eric Miller and Its Investigation, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 11, 2004, at A16.
4. See In re Investigation of Death of Eric Miller (Miller I), 357 N.C. 316, 319-20, 584
S.E.2d 772, 777 (2003); Dorell, Arsenic Case Hinges on Circumstantial Evidence, supra
note 1.
5. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 319-20, 584 S.E.2d at 777.
6. Id.
7. Id.; Cain, supra note 3.
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The court ordered Gammon to reveal the substance of his
conversations with Willard. Gammon responded by invoking the
attorney-client privilege and refusing to disclose the contents of the
conversations.8 The attorney-client privilege protects the confidential
communications between an attorney and client from revelation,
requiring an attorney to keep the privileged information confidential.9
The court's order put Gammon in a difficult situation. Disclosing
privileged information would subject Gammon to discipline from the
North Carolina State Bar.10 Conversely, if Gammon refused a court
order to reveal the information, he could be held in contempt, serve
jail time, or lose his license to practice law."
In In re Investigation of Death of Eric Miller (Miller ),12 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina granted discretionary review to
determine whether the trial court could order Gammon to reveal the
contents of his conversations with Willard. 3 The court's opinion
specifically addresses whether the contents of Willard's conversations
with Gammon are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege. The problem is that the opinion speaks about the scope of
the privilege's protection in broad terms that could potentially extend
far beyond the facts of the case.14 In brief, Miller I upholds existing
8. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 320, 584 S.E.2d at 778.
9. See id. at 328, 584 S.E.2d at 782; State v. McIntosh, 336 N.C. 517, 523, 444 S.E.2d
438, 441-42 (1994).
10. See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2004). Rule 8.4 states that any
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct shall be professional misconduct. Rule 1.6
establishes a duty of confidentiality. This duty of confidentiality is different from the
attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary common law
doctrine that applies in limited contexts. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
Rule 1.6 is an ethical duty that governs all information an attorney receives relating to the
representation of a client. Because Rule 1.6 is broader than the attorney-client privilege, it
necessarily covers information protected by the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, if
Gammon wrongly revealed privileged information, he would also violate Rule 1.6 and
would be guilty of professional misconduct pursuant to Rule 8.4. See also R. 1.6 cmt. 14
(requiring a lawyer who is ordered to reveal information relating to a client's
representation to assert all nonfrivolous claims that the information sought is protected
from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law). But see id. R. 1.6
cmt. 13 (noting that other law may supersede Rule 1.6, in which case paragraph (b)(1) of
the Rule permits "such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law").
11. North Carolina courts have an inherent power to discipline attorneys. In re Delk,
336 N.C. 543, 550, 444 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1994). This power includes the ability to disbar an
attorney. Id. The North Carolina State Bar also has the authority to sanction attorneys.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28 (2003). See Andrea Weigl, How Safe Are Your Secrets? What
Your Doctors, Lawyers and Clergy May Reveal, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July
7, 2002, at A19.
12. 357 N.C. 316, 584 S.E.2d 772 (2003).
13. Id. at 320-21, 584 S.E.2d at 778.
14. See id. passim.
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case law establishing the scope of the attorney-client privilege, but
then carves out an exception to the privilege, holding that when the
underlying justifications for the privilege are not furthered by its
continued application, the privilege ceases to apply. 15 The court's
decision raised concern within the local legal community that future
courts might apply the holding broadly, severely eroding the
protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege. 16
This concern is not unwarranted. While the court attempted to
limit its holding to the facts of Miller I, the holding is broad enough to
leave open the possibility that North Carolina courts will use Miller I
to justify a wide variety of intrusions upon the attorney-client
privilege. However, this Recent Development predicts that Miller I
will be narrowly applied by future courts and thus should not pose a
great threat to the attorney-client privilege. The analysis first outlines
the current standards North Carolina courts utilize for applying the
attorney-client privilege and how the holding in Miller I alters those
standards. It then examines the potential application of Miller I
beyond its facts and concludes that the court intended its broad
language to ensure the revelation of Willard's conversations with
Gammon, but did not intend to generally corrode the protections of
the attorney-client privilege.17 The next section predicts that the
United States Supreme Court's recent holding in Crawford v.
Washington 8 will not protect Willard's conversations with Gammon
and statements made under similar circumstances from being
admitted as evidence in criminal trials. This section also explores
whether the United States Supreme Court's holding in Ohio v.
Roberts9 will keep the statement from being admitted, concluding
that it will not. Finally, this Recent Development discusses the
impact the holdings in Miller I and Crawford will have on how North
Carolina attorneys practice law.
A review of the circumstances surrounding Eric Miller's death
provides context for the issue facing the Supreme Court of North
15. Id. at 342-43, 584 S.E.2d at 791.
16. See Matthew Eisley, Nearly Half Favor Disclosure, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Sept. 19, 2003, at B6; Legal Events: Dead Men Tell No Tales, but from Now On in
North Carolina, the Task Might Fall to Their Lawyers, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 18,
2003, at 10, LEXIS, Business & News Library, MIADBR File.
17. See Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 342, 584 S.E.2d at 790 (noting that "the instant case
presents unique circumstances," and emphasizing that it is "a rare case where the full
application of the [holding's] rationale would apply.").
18. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
19. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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Carolina in Miller 1.20 In November 2000, Eric Miller was hospitalized
for arsenic poisoning following an evening spent with his wife and her
co-workers, including Derril Willard, at a bowling alley.2' That
evening Willard gave Miller a beer which Miller remarked had a
"funny taste." 2  Miller recovered at home until December 1, when he
became violently ill and returned to the hospital. 3 He died the
following day.24 An autopsy and toxicology report indicated that
Miller received at least one dose of arsenic months before he died and
at least two doses in the days and weeks prior to his death, including
one administered during his final hospitalization.' Kontz cremated
Miller's body and refused police requests for interviews except to
comment to police on the day of Miller's death that she had no idea
why anyone would poison him.26 A search of Kontz's workspace at
GlaxoSmithKline produced a chemical compound containing arsenic,
and further testing proved that the arsenic found in Miller's body
matched the substance found in Kontz's lab.27
Willard also refused requests for police interviews after Miller's
death.28 Police soon learned that Kontz and Willard were involved in
a romantic relationship and had contacted each other with increasing
frequency immediately before and after the bowling alley incident.29
Shortly after Miller's death, Willard met with attorney Rick Gammon
to obtain legal counsel.3" Following this meeting, Willard told his wife
he might be charged with the attempted murder of Miller.3 Willard
committed suicide on January 22, 2001.32 He left a note that stated in
part, "I have been accused of an action for which I am not
responsible. I have taken no one's life, save my own."33
20. For a sequential summary of the facts of the investigation and subsequent court
proceedings, see Cain, supra note 3.




25. Cain, supra note 3.
26. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 319, 584 S.E.2d at 777.
27. Cain, supra note 3.
28. Miller I, 357 N.C. at 319, 584 S.E.2d at 777.
29. Id. at 319-20, 584 S.E.2d at 777.
30. Id. at 320, 584 S.E.2d at 777.
31. Id.
32. Cain, supra note 3.
33. Id.; Andrea Weigl & Oren Dorrell, Part of What Derril Willard Told His Lawyer
Is Read in Court, Implicating Eric Miller's Wife, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec.
11, 2004, at Al.
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Prosecutors wanted more than circumstantial evidence before
charging anyone with Miller's murder.34 After learning of Willard's
consultations with Gammon, prosecutors sought disclosure of the
substance of their conversations.35 The Wake County Superior Court
ordered Gammon to provide the court with a sealed affidavit for an in
camera review to determine whether the interests of justice required
disclosure of the information.36  Gammon appealed the order,
claiming the information was protected under the attorney-client
privilege. The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed to a
discretionary review of Gammon's appeal.37
The Supreme Court of North Carolina did not know the contents
of Willard's conversations with Gammon when it considered
Gammon's appeal of the trial court's ruling.3" The conversations were
likely to contain one of three revelations relevant to the murder
investigation: (1) Willard confessed to murdering Miller; (2) Willard
confessed to involvement, with the aid of a third party, in Miller's
murder; or (3) Willard revealed the third party killer's identity.
Prosecutors believed Gammon possessed information that would help
identify the killer or absolve potential suspects of guilt.39 Willard's
suicide declaration that he had not taken anyone's life supported this
belief, creating speculation among police and the prosecution that the
conversations would identify Kontz as the murderer.4" In order to
discover what information Willard disclosed to Gammon, prosecutors
needed the court to conclude that the conversations were not
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
In North Carolina, the attorney-client privilege is a common law
doctrine and not a statutory codification.41  While there are
34. See Brief for Appellee at 6, Miller I (No. 303PA02), available at http://www.
ncappellatecourts.org/nc.main-l.nsf (noting that the district attorney sought disclosure of
the information Gammon received from Willard) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). Prosecutors did not charge Kontz with Eric Miller's murder until after they
learned the contents of the conversation. Andrea Weigl, Miller's Widow Charged, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 28,2004, at Al.
35. See Cain, supra note 3. Prosecutors learned of the consultations from Willard's
widow. Id.
36. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 320, 584 S.E.2d at 777-78; Cain, supra note 3.
37. Id. at 320-21, 584 S.E.2d at 778.
38. Id. at 320-21, 584 S.E.2d at 777-78 (noting that the trial court stayed compliance
with its order that Gammon reveal the contents of the conversation pending appeal).
39. See Brief for Appellee at 4-5, Miller I (No. 303PA02), available at http://www.nc
appellatecourts.org/ncmain_l.nsf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
40. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Miller I (No. 303PA02), available at http://www.nc
appellatecourts.org/nc.mainl.nsf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
41. Miller I, 357 N.C. at 329, 584 S.E.2d at 783; Kenneth S. Broun, Death and the
Privilege, N.C. ST. B. J., Spring 2004, at 48; William A. Oden, III, Comment, To Speak or
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exceptions to the privilege that permit disclosure,42 the privilege is
absolute in the sense that a trial judge lacks the discretion to abrogate
it.43 The privilege belongs to the client, not the attorney." Thus, the
attorney is not at liberty to waive the privilege without obtaining
informed consent from the client.45 Absent informed client consent,
an attorney may not reveal information acquired during the
professional relationship with the client.46
Prosecutors raised two alternative arguments to persuade the
court that Willard's statements to Gammon fell within an exception
to the attorney-client privilege. First, they argued that Mrs. Willard-
acting as the executrix of her husband's estate and therefore as his
personal representative-waived the privilege.47 Second, prosecutors
argued that the trial court properly applied a balancing test within its
inherent authority to act in the interests of justice when it ordered the
communications disclosed.48 The supreme court found neither
argument compelling.49
Not To Speak, That Is the Question: The Impact of Attorney-Client Privilege in Prosecuting
the Death of Dr. Eric Miller, 25 CAMPBELL L. REV. 235, 239 (2003).
42. See Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 328, 584 S.E.2d at 782 (citing State v. McIntosh, 336 N.C.
517, 524, 444 S.E.2d 438, 442 (1994) (permitting disclosure where the defendant consulted
an attorney solely to facilitate the defendant's surrender); State v. Taylor, 327 N.C. 147,
152, 393 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1990) (permitting disclosure through a waiver where the client
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Brown, 327 N.C. 1, 21, 394 S.E.2d 434,
446 (1990) (permitting disclosure where the communications were conducted in the
presence of a third party not acting as an agent); In re Will of Kemp, 236 N.C. 680, 684, 73
S.E.2d 906, 909-10 (1953) (permitting disclosure when the attorney testified as to
testator's intent in an estate dispute)).
43. Broun, supra note 41, at 48.
44. Miller I, 357 N.C. at 339, 584 S.E.2d at 788; Taylor, 327 N.C. at 152, 393 S.E.2d at
805.
45. See State v. Bronson, 333 N.C. 67, 76, 423 S.E.2d 772, 777 (1992); Taylor, 327 N.C.
at 152,393 S.E.2d at 805.
46. See Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 328, 584 S.E.2d at 782.
47. See Brief for Appellee at 25, Miller I (No. 303PA02), available at http://www.nc
appellatecourts.org/nc main-l.nsf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
48. See id.
49. See Miller I, 357 N.C. at 323-34, 584 S.E.2d at 779-85. The court prefaced its
discussion of the State's arguments by holding that the attorney-client privilege survives
the client's death. Id. at 323, 584 S.E.2d at 779 (citing the United States Supreme Court's
and other jurisdictions' recognition that the attorney-client privilege continues after the
client's death); see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998); State v.
Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976); Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 200 (Colo.
2001); Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Ind. 1996); Dist. Attorney for Norfolk
Dist. v. Magraw, 628 N.E.2d 24, 26 (Mass. 1994); McCaffrey v. Estate of Brennan, 533
S.W.2d 264, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Taylor v. Sheldon, 173 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ohio 1961);
Curato v. Brain, 715 A.2d 631, 636 (R.I. 1998); S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Booker, 195
S.E.2d 615, 620 (S.C. 1973). The court then concluded that Mrs. Willard did not have the
authority to waive her husband's attorney-client privilege. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 327, 584
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Rather than searching for possible exceptions to the privilege
that would permit the disclosure of Willard's statements, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina began by questioning whether the
communications fell within the scope of the attorney-client privilege.0
To determine whether the attorney-client privilege applies to a
particular communication, the courts in North Carolina apply a five-
part test known as the McIntosh test.51 If Willard's conversations with
Gammon satisfied the five prongs of the McIntosh test, then Gammon
was bound to keep the contents of these conversations confidential.
The five prongs are:
(1) the relation of attorney and client existed at the time the
communication was made, (2) the communication was made in
confidence, (3) the communication relates to a matter about
which the attorney is being professionally consulted, (4) the
communication was made in the course of giving or seeking
legal advice for a proper purpose although litigation need not
be contemplated and (5) the client has not waived the
privilege. 2
The court framed the central issue in Miller I as "whether, during
a criminal investigation, there can be a legal basis for the application
of the interest of justice balancing test or an exception to the
attorney-client privilege which would allow a trial court to compel the
disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications when the
client is deceased. ' 53  A court could determine whether Willard's
statement satisfied the first, second, and fifth prongs of the McIntosh
S.E.2d at 782. Finally, the court addressed the trial court's use of the balancing test. The
trial court applied the balancing test without the benefit of in camera review and ordered
Gammon to produce an affidavit. In its order, the trial court stated that "the State's and
the public's interest in determining the identity of the person or persons responsible for
the death of Eric Miller outweigh the public interest in protecting ... the attorney-client
privilege." Id. at 327-28, 584 S.E.2d at 782. The supreme court declined to apply a
balancing test to determine the applicability of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 332-33,
584 S.E.2d at 785. While noting elsewhere in the opinion that the common law
"demonstrates a practical flexibility and ingenuity to accommodate exigent circumstances
where required in the interest of justice," id. at 322, 584 S.E.2d at 778, the court preferred
a bright line rule for determining when a privilege applies, see id. at 332-33, 584 S.E.2d at
785 (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of balancing tests as against bright line
rules). The court's reasoning rested upon its concern that a balancing test would have "a
corrosive effect on the privilege's traditionally stable application" and the likely
consequence of judicial arbitrariness and inequality in determinations. Id. at 333, 584
S.E.2d at 785.
50. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 335,584 S.E.2d at 786.
51. See State v. McIntosh, 336 N.C. 517, 523-24, 444 S.E.2d 438, 442 (1994).
52. Id. (quoting State v. Murvin, 304 N.C. 523, 531,284 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1981)).
53. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 321,584 S.E.2d at 778.
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test without knowing the substance of the communications. 4
However, the court noted that in order to determine whether
Willard's statement satisfies the third and fourth prongs of the
McIntosh test-whether the communications relate to a matter about
which the attorney is being professionally consulted and whether the
communications were made in the course of giving or seeking legal
advice for a proper purpose-the court must be privy to the contents
of the communications.55 Therefore, the court held that "where the
party seeking the information has, in good faith, come forward with a
nonfrivolous assertion that the privilege does not apply, the trial court
may conduct an in camera inquiry of the substance of the
communication." 6 The court concluded that it was proper for the
trial court to order Gammon to provide a sealed affidavit containing a
transcript of the conversations between himself and Willard in order
for the trial court to ascertain whether the conversations were
protected by the attorney-client privilege.57 The court also held that
disclosure of the conversations for in camera review does not have
the legal effect of terminating the privilege.58 The court concluded
that if, upon examination of the contents, the conversations did not
meet the McIntosh test, the attorney-client privilege does not apply
and Gammon must reveal the substance of the conversations. 9
The court's decision in Miller I provided guidance to lower
courts evaluating a communication under the third and fourth prongs
of the McIntosh test. Under McIntosh, only those communications
that are part of the client's purpose for the legal consultation are
privileged.6" Thus, "communications between an attorney and a client
that relate to or concern the interests, rights, activities, motives,
liabilities, or plans of some third party, the disclosure of which would
54. These three McIntosh prongs inquire whether an attorney-client relationship
existed at the time of the communication, whether the communication was made in
confidence, and whether a client has waived the privilege, respectively. See id. at 336, 584
S.E.2d at 787.
55. Id.
56. Id. An in camera review is only necessary where the contents of the
communication are not known to the trial court. In McIntosh and Murvin, the trial courts
were privy to the contents of the respective communications and the only issue was
whether to reveal the contents to the jury. See McIntosh, 336 N.C. at 523, 444 S.E.2d at
441 (appealing the trial court's decision to admit testimony of the defendant's attorney);
State v. Murvin, 304 N.C. 523, 530, 284 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1981) (appealing the trial court's
decision that the contents of an attorney's affidavit were not protected by the attorney-
client privilege).
57. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 337,584 S.E.2d at 788.
58. Id. at 337, 584 S.E.2d at 787.
59. See id.
60. McIntosh, 336 N.C. at 523, 444 S.E.2d at 442.
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not tend to harm the client, do not logically fall within North
Carolina's definition of attorney-client privileged information." 61
The communications must also relate to a proper purpose. Thus,
communications relating to a third party's criminal activity do not
satisfy the fourth prong of McIntosh where disclosure of the
communications would not tend to harm the interests of the client.62
The Miller I court therefore concluded its application of McIntosh by
observing that if Willard's statements implicated a third party as the
killer, the communications were not privileged.63 However, the court
noted that if Willard's statements would subject him to criminal
liability, regardless of whether they implicated a third party, the
communications were covered by the privilege.6' Therefore,
according to the Miller I court, only those statements relating solely
to a third party are not privileged.65
Prior to Miller I, a communication satisfying all five prongs of the
McIntosh test ended the inquiry-the communication was
privileged.66 Miller I adds an additional layer of analysis in that
meeting all five prongs of the McIntosh test no longer guarantees that
a communication remains privileged. Miller I holds that where a
communication meets the McIntosh test, the trial court should then
apply the maxim cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex: "[w]hen the
underlying justification for the rule of law, or in this case the
privilege, is not furthered by its continued application, the rule or
privilege should cease to apply. '67 Accordingly, the trial court should
inquire "whether nondisclosure in the present case furthers the
purpose for which the privilege exists."'  Therefore, where
nondisclosure does not further the purpose of the privilege, the
communication may be disclosed.
The court defines the purpose for which the attorney-client
privilege exists in terms of the three consequences that might result
61. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 338, 584 S.E.2d at 788; see also Broun, supra note 41, at 50
(noting that the court's conclusion that the privilege does not extend to a conversation
regarding the legal rights of a third party is "unquestionably consistent with existing
authority").
62. Miller 1, 357 N.C at 338,584 S.E.2d at 788.
63. Id. at 340, 584 S.E.2d at 789.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court notes that where a person is acting as an agent of a third party
principal when the communication is made, the communication is within the privilege. Id.
at 340-41, 584 S.E.2d at 789-90.
66. See McIntosh, 336 N.C. at 523-24, 444 S.E.2d at 442 (finding a communication
privileged after failing to inquire beyond the five prongs of the articulated test).
67. Miller I, 357 N.C. at 341,584 S.E.2d at 790.
68. Id.
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from disclosure of a client's communication with an attorney, labeling
these consequences the Swidler factors: 69 "(1) that disclosure might
subject the client to criminal liability; (2) that disclosure might subject
the client, or the client's estate, to civil liability; and (3) that
disclosure might harm the client's loved ones or his reputation."7
The trial court should consider the Swidler factors during an in
camera review of a privileged communication.7' If disclosure of the
communication implicates one of these consequences, the
communication should remain undisclosed.72  If, however, the
communication would have no negative impact on the client's
interests, the purpose for the privilege no longer exists and the
communication may be disclosed.73
Employing the Swidler factors to determine whether
communications should remain protected by the attorney-client
privilege is unprecedented in North Carolina, and the ambiguity in
the court's opinion raises questions about the scope of the protections
afforded by the privilege. Namely, do the exceptions to the privilege
outlined by the court apply only to fact situations similar to that in
Miller I case, or is their application broader? If limited to the facts of
Miller I, the holding will have little to no effect on the scope of the
privilege. Conversely, a broad application of the exceptions could
severely erode the attorney-client privilege.
The court begins by framing the issue presented in Miller I as
applying in situations where the client is deceased and the
information is sought for use in a criminal investigation.74 However,
the court does not clarify whether these limiting conditions apply to
69. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998), the United States
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the attorney-client privilege survives
the death of the client. The Court noted that there are "weighty reasons" in favor of a
posthumous application of the privilege, stating that "[w]hile the fear of disclosure ... may
be reduced if disclosure is limited to posthumous disclosure in a criminal context, it seems
unreasonable to assume that it vanishes altogether. Clients may be concerned about
reputation, civil liability, or possible harm to friends or family." Id. at 407. It is this
passage that the Supreme Court of North Carolina cites as the basis for its Swidler factors.
However, the United States Supreme Court did not apply a formal three-factor test to
determine whether and when the privilege applies but merely stated the possible concerns
a client may have. Id. Thus, the so-called Swidler factors seem to be an invention of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
70. Miller I, 357 N.C. at 341-42,584 S.E.2d at 790.
71. Id. at 342, 584 S.E.2d at 790-91.
72. Id. at 342, 584 S.E.2d at 790.
73. Id. The court emphasized that its holding does not reach the question of whether
such a communication would be admissible as evidence in a criminal proceeding. Id. at
343, 584 S.E.2d at 791.
74. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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the application of the McIntosh test, to the application of the Swidler
factors, or to the entire attorney-client privilege inquiry. Indeed,
there is sufficient ambiguity in the court's opinion to conclude that
these limiting conditions do not apply to any portion of the
application of the McIntosh test. Given this confusion, it is necessary
to examine the scope of the application of the McIntosh test before
exploring the ambiguities surrounding the application of the Swidler
factors. Clarifying the scope of the application of the McIntosh test
may explain the intended scope of the Swidler factors.
Portions of Miller I can be construed as requiring the presence of
two conditions before a court can conduct an in camera review of an
attorney-client communication for purposes of applying the McIntosh
test: the client must be deceased, and the information must be sought
for use in a criminal investigation.75 The court begins its opinion in
Miller I by framing the question presented as whether an exception to
the attorney-client privilege is warranted where there is a criminal
investigation and the client is deceased. Additionally, the summary of
the opinion is prefaced with the phrase: "we hold that when a client
is deceased ".... 7 These general statements imply that the context
of a criminal investigation and the death of the client are necessary
conditions for any portion of the Miller I analysis to apply. However,
a quick study reveals that the McIntosh test is equally applicable in
situations where the client is living and, most likely, can be employed
in the civil context.77
The two prior cases employing the McIntosh test-State v.
McIntosh78 and State v. Murvin7 9 -involved clients living at the time
of trial. This fact is conclusive evidence that the test is not limited to
situations where the client is deceased and indicates the Miller I court
did not intend the limiting language "we hold that when a client is
deceased..." to apply to the McIntosh test.
75. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
76. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 342,584 S.E.2d at 791.
77. Interestingly, in arguing for the application of an interests of justice balancing test,
the State envisioned several limiting conditions, including: (1) the client must be
deceased; (2) the case must be a criminal matter; and (3) the crime must be murder. See
Brief for Appellee at 72-74, Miller I (No. 303PA02) (listing seven limiting conditions),
available at http://www.ncappellatecourts.org/nc-main-l.nsf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). These conditions have no bearing on the court's holding in
Miller I, because the court declined to adopt the balancing test. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
78. 336 N.C. 517, 444 S.E.2d 438 (1994).
79. 304 N.C. 523,284 S.E.2d 289 (1981). The so-called McIntosh test was first applied
thirteen years prior to McIntosh in State v. Murvin. Id. at 531, 284 S.E.2d at 294. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina refers to the five-prong test as the McIntosh test.
16012005]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Less clear is whether a court can apply the McIntosh test in a
civil case. Thus far, the test has only been applied in criminal cases
like McIntosh, Murvin, and Miller I. However, the factors themselves
are not written in terms that restrict them to application in a criminal
context, and in Miller I the court discusses the application of the third
and fourth prongs of the test in general terms.8" Further, while the
court uses limiting language throughout its opinion,81 its formulation
of when to apply the McIntosh test makes no mention of necessary
conditions limiting application of the test to the criminal context.
Instead, Miller I states that where a party applies to the court in good
faith and with a nonfrivolous assertion that the privilege does not
apply, the court may conduct an in camera review of the
communication to determine if it meets the McIntosh criteria.82
The court's use of general language when explaining the
application of the McIntosh test is by no means a guarantee that the
McIntosh inquiry is applicable in civil cases, and it is possible that a
later court will expressly limit the inquiry to the criminal context. In
the absence of a final determination of the scope of McIntosh's
application, prudent attorneys should presume it is equally applicable
in the civil context.
Having addressed the impact of the limiting conditions of the
death of the client and the context of a criminal investigation on the
McIntosh test, the question remains whether the scope of the
application of the Swidler factors is limited to situations analogous to
the facts of Miller I or if it has broader implications. A court only
applies the Swidler factors if it finds that the communication is
otherwise privileged under McIntosh.83 Because it is apparent that
the McIntosh test is not restricted by the limiting language of Miller I,
and because it is likely the court purposefully included the statements
restricting its holding to situations where the client has died and the
information is sought for use in a criminal investigation, it follows that
the court directed that limiting language to the application of the
Swidler factors.84
80. See Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 337-38, 584 S.E.2d at 788.
81. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
82. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 336, 584 S.E.2d at 787.
83. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
84. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 321, 584 S.E.2d at 778 (framing the issue in the case as
"whether, during a criminal investigation, there can be a legal basis for the application of
the interest of justice balancing test or an exception to the attorney-client privilege which
would allow a trial court to compel the disclosure of confidential attorney-client
communications when the client is deceased"). In addition to the general statements
regarding the death of the client and the necessity of a criminal investigation, the court
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If the Swidler factors are not so restricted, then Miller I severely
corrodes the protections of the attorney-client privilege. To illustrate
the extent to which a broad interpretation of Miller I could reduce the
protections of the privilege, consider a hypothetical situation
Professor Kenneth Broun posed in his article Death and the
Privilege.85 Assume a client consults a lawyer with regard to his civil
liability in a tort claim involving several defendants. The client settles
his dispute, but the other defendants proceed to trial where the
client's lawyer is called as a witness. It is unclear whether the
privilege would still attach to the client's communication or whether a
court would apply the Swidler factors and require disclosure upon
determining that the client would no longer be negatively impacted
by the attorney's testimony.86 A finding that a court might apply the
Swidler factors in such a situation could chill a client's willingness to
engage in a "full and frank communication" with his attorney.87
Establishing how broadly the courts will apply the Swidler factors
is therefore critical in determining the impact Miller I actually has on
changing the level of protection afforded by the attorney-client
privilege. Unfortunately, the court did not clearly set boundaries for
the application of the Swidler factors, and the court should clarify this
point at the next possible opportunity. Until the court expressly
addresses this question, an examination of the court's treatment of
the Swidler factors in Miller I and its subsequent review of the trial
court's application of the Miller I holding in In re Investigation of
Death of Eric Miller (Miller II)8 must suffice as a means of
interpreting the scope of the application of the Swidler factors.8 9
stated that where the communications are outside of the scope of the privilege, "the trial
court may compel the attorney to provide the substance of the communication to the State
for its use in the criminal investigation." Id. at 343, 584 S.E.2d at 791.
85. Broun, supra note 41. Professor Broun maintains that the court's application of
cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex does not follow from the rationale of the attorney-
client privilege. Id. at 50. The purpose of the privilege is to encourage communication of
information between attorney and client, not to protect the client from adverse
consequences. Id. Professor Broun argues that the court departed from existing authority
in applying this maxim to the attorney-client privilege, warning that the broad language
employed by the court may make it difficult to limit the impact of the holding to situations
similar to that in the Miller case. Id. at 50-51.
86. Id. at 50.
87. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
88. 358 N.C. 364,595 S.E.2d 120 (Miller II) (2004).
89. Miller I remanded the case to the trial court for a determination on whether the
information contained in Gammon's affidavit was privileged. The trial court found the
information was not protected, but required the affidavit to remain sealed pending review
by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Id. at 367-68,595 S.E.2d at 122-23.
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The first Swidler factor a court must consider is whether
disclosure of a communication would subject the client to criminal
liability.90 Despite appearing to apply only to living clients-since the
threat of criminal liability would not have a negative impact on a
deceased client-this factor also applies to deceased clients. While
the supreme court did not reach the Swidler factors portion of the
analysis in Miller 11,91 the court noted that it did not disagree with the
trial court's conclusion that disclosure would not expose Willard to
criminal liability "even if he were living."'  Coupled with the limiting
language employed in Miller I, this application of the first Swidler
factor indicates the court's intent to limit the application of the
Swidler factors to deceased clients. Despite this apparent intent,
there is sufficient ambiguity in the court's phrasing to allow a
subsequent court to interpret the application broadly and apply it to
situations in which the client is living.
The second Swidler factor considers whether disclosure might
subject the client or the client's estate to civil liability.93 The fact that
this factor references civil liability raises the question of whether the
holding is limited to the use of privileged information for the
furtherance of criminal investigations. The court appears to deny any
such limitation in the summary of its holding in Miller I, restating the
Swidler inquiry as allowing disclosure "upon a clear and convincing
showing that ... disclosure does not expose the client's estate to civil
liability and that such disclosure would not likely result in additional
harm to loved ones or reputation. ' 94 This restatement fosters the
inference that a court may employ the factors outside of the criminal
context.95
The third Swidler factor, which is the least well-explained and
defined of the three, further limits the situations to which the Swidler
inquiry would apply. This factor inquires whether disclosure would
90. Miller I, 357 N.C. at 341-42, 584 S.E.2d at 790.
91. Miller II, 358 N.C. at 369, 595 S.E.2d at 123. The court found that it was
unnecessary for the trial court to determine whether the communication affected Willard's
rights and interests because the communication failed the McIntosh test, and therefore the
trial court should have stopped its analysis before reaching the Swidler factors. Id. at 369,
595 S.E.2d at 123. Thus, the court's discussion of the Swidler factors is dicta.
92. Id.
93. Miller !, 357 N.C. at 342,584 S.E.2d at 790.
94. Id. at 343, 584 S.E.2d at 791.
95. This restatement also supports, but does not expressly ratify, the conclusion that
the Swidler factors apply only where the client is deceased.
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harm the client's loved ones or his reputation.96 Thus, even in a
situation where disclosure would not subject a client to criminal or
civil liability, a court has the discretion to suppress the information
based on a determination that disclosure would harm the client's
reputation or family. This discretion could drastically narrow the
pool of potential cases where the application of the Swidler factors
would result in the disclosure of privileged communications.
The court indicated in Miller II that Miller I should be viewed as
a very narrow exception to the attorney-client privilege.97 Following
Miller I, attorney Gammon delivered a seven-page affidavit detailing
his conversations with Willard to the superior court.98 The trial judge
concluded that its contents were not protected by the attorney-client
privilege but kept the contents under seal while Gammon appealed
the decision. 9 The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the
trial court's conclusion that the contents of the affidavit, in particular
"Paragraph 12,"" related solely to the activities of a third party, were
not privileged under the McIntosh test, and were therefore subject to
disclosure.' The court ended its opinion with a cautionary note
emphasizing that "this very narrow exception to the attorney-client
96. Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 342, 584 S.E.2d at 790. The phrasing of this factor also
supports the conclusion that the Swidler factors are only applied where the client is
deceased.
97. Miller I1, 358 N.C. at 370, 595 S.E.2d at 124.
98. Id. at 367, 595 S.E.2d at 122.
99. See Cain, supra note 3.
100. As summarized by the Wake County Assistant District Attorney, Paragraph 12
reads as follows:
Mr. Willard then stated that on one recent occasion he had met Mrs. Miller in a
parking lot, and they had a conversation while in an SUV. He stated that during
this conversation Mrs. Miller was crying and that she told him she had been to the
hospital where Mr. Miller had been admitted. She stated to Mr. Willard that she
was by herself in the room with Mr. Miller for a period of time. She then told Mr.
Willard that she took a syringe and needle from her purse and injected the
contents of the syringe into Mr. Miller's L.V. Upon being questioned as to the
contents of the syringe, Mr. Willard either stated the substance was from work or
that Mrs. Miller had told him it was from work. He then stated that he asked Mrs.
Miller why she had done this, and she replied, "I don't know." Mr. Willard
surmised that Mrs. Miller was attempting to end Mr. Miller's suffering from his
illness with these actions. Although Mr. Gammon and Mr. [Trey] Fitzhugh do not
recall specifically whether Mr. Willard or Mrs. Miller used the word "arsenic" with
reference to the contents of the syringe, it was clear that the substance contained
in the syringe was poisonous. Mr. Willard then stated that he knew nothing
further of the circumstances surrounding Eric Miller's death. He also stated that
he had not told anyone, including his wife, about Mrs. Miller's statements to him.
Id.
101. Miller II, 358 N.C. at 369, 595 S.E.2d at 123.
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privilege should be appropriately limited both as to its scope and
method of disclosure.' 1 2
While it therefore remains unclear whether the review of
attorney-client privilege outlined in Miller I is limited to situations
where the client is deceased and there is a criminal investigation, the
court has expressed its intent to keep the exception narrow.
Application of the third and fourth prongs of the McIntosh test seem
to apply to all attorney-client communications and is not limited to
situations where the client is deceased or the context is criminal.103
Less clear is whether application of the Swidler factors is intended to
apply to all situations or is circumscribed to situations similar to the
facts of the Miller case. The Swidler factors could serve as an all-
purpose exception to the rule of attorney-client privilege for cases
like the Miller case where the public interest in knowing the
substance of the communications is great. The court's opinion does
not foreclose this possibility. However, Miller I strongly suggests
that, at the very least, the application of the Swidler factors is limited
to situations where the client is deceased, and future courts are likely
to interpret the holding to comport with those indications) °4
Additionally, the court's warning that the test set out in Miller I
represents a narrow legal standard makes a broad application of the
Swidler factors unlikely. 105  If future courts interpret Miller I as
allowing the Swidler factors to act as an all-purpose exception to the
attorney-client privilege, they may find it necessary to employ the
type of interests of justice balancing test that the court disavowed in
Miller P06 and Miller I/17 in order to choose the cases to which it
ought apply-determining whether the public interest in knowing the
substance of the communications outweighs the public interest in
protecting the attorney-client privilege. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina intended Miller I to provide a bright line rule for the
determination of privilege. 108 It is therefore unlikely that future
courts will construe Miller I in a manner requiring the use of a
102. Id. at 370, 595 S.E.2d at 124.
103. This conclusion is based on the fact that the authority upon which the court's
interpretation relies involves a living client. See State v. Murvin, 304 N.C. 523, 530-31, 284
S.E.2d 289, 294 (1981). Application of the fourth McIntosh factor is limited to the criminal
context by its terms, since the inquiry focuses on whether the consultation is for a proper
purpose. This conclusion is also consistent with Murvin, which involved the criminal
prosecution of the client's boyfriend. Id.
104. See supra notes 84,91-93 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
106. See Miller 1, 357 N.C. 316, 333,584 S.E.2d 772, 785 (2003).
107. See Miller 11, 358 N.C. at 369, 595 S.E.2d at 123.
108. See Miller 1, 357 N.C. at 332-33, 584 S.E.2d at 785.
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balancing test. Having explained the application of the McIntosh
factors and the Swidler test, the analysis now turns to the admissibility
of attorney-client communications under the rules of evidence.
Determining whether and when an attorney-client
communication may be disclosed using the McIntosh factors and the
Swidler test is only the first half of the inquiry. A court concluding
that a communication is not privileged must still address the issue of
whether the communication is admissible at trial. The admissibility of
an out-of-court communication hinges on two determinations:
whether it fits within a hearsay exception and whether it violates the
Confrontation Clause.
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of
hearsay, or out-of-court statements, absent a statutory exception. 1°9
The admission of "Paragraph 12" raises a double hearsay issue.
Willard's statement to Gammon is hearsay, and Gammon's affidavit,
containing Willard's statement, represents a second level of hearsay.
Thus, Willard's statement is admissible, and Gammon is required to
testify only if the statement fits within a hearsay exception.110 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina did not reach this issue in
Miller /.
Regardless of whether Willard's statement is admissible hearsay,
a court cannot admit it as evidence if such an admission violates the
Confrontation Clause. The United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Crawford v. Washington1 12 redefines the role of the Confrontation
Clause in relation to testimonial hearsay and changes the way courts
determine whether hearsay is admissible in a criminal prosecution. A
determination of whether Willard's statement is admissible under the
Confrontation Clause thus requires an analysis of the holding in
Crawford.
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees that in
criminal prosecutions "the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.""1 3 Prior to Crawford,
under Ohio v. Roberts,14 an out-of-court statement could be admitted
in a criminal prosecution so long as it had "adequate indicia of
109. See N.C. R. EVID. 802.
110. In the alternative, Gammon's affidavit would also have to fit a hearsay exception.
However, since the affidavit was ordered by the court, and since Gammon is available to
testify, it is likely that the court will either require him to testify or find the affidavit fits
into the residual exception of the hearsay rule. See N.C. R. EvID. 803(24).
111. Miller I, 357 N.C. at 344, 584 S.E.2d at 792.
112. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
114. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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reliability," meaning it fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception"
or it bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.""' 5 Crawford
held that where testimonial hearsay is concerned, the Confrontation
Clause requires that the declarant be unavailable and that the accused
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 1 6  Both
conditions must be satisfied, or the evidence is inadmissible." 7
Crawford only applies to testimonial hearsay."8 The Supreme Court
declined to fully define the term "testimonial," stating that at a
minimum the term applies to "prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police
interrogations."'' 9 The Court referenced other formulations of the
term "testimonial," including "statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial."120
Crawford also left open the question of whether the Roberts
standard continues to apply to nontestimonial hearsay, or if the
Confrontation Clause is altogether unconcerned with nontestimonial
hearsay.' 2' That is, if a statement is deemed nontestimonial and
therefore is not bound by the Crawford requirements, must that
statement meet the standards set forth in Roberts, or is it
automatically admissible? Lower federal courts have reached
different conclusions when addressing the issue.122 The Court of
Appeals of North Carolina also appears to be undecided whether
Roberts applies to nontestimonial evidence. In 2004, the court of
115. Id. at 66. See generally Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (explaining and
applying the Roberts approach).




120. Id. at 52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by
Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
121. See id. at 62 ("Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent
with the Framers' design to afford the states flexibility in their development of hearsay
law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether."); Ferguson v. Roper, 400 F.3d 635, 638-40 (8th
Cir. 2005); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RiCH. L. REV. 511, 515 (2005) (stating that Crawford left
unresolved "what remains of the old system under Roberts").
122. Compare United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding
that nontestimonial statements continue to be subject to the Roberts standard), with
United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that, in light of
Crawford, the Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of nontestimonial statements
and making no mention of Roberts).
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appeals applied Roberts to nontestimonial hearsay and explicitly held
that Roberts remains good law for nontestimonial statements. 23
Despite this declaration that Roberts applies, the court of appeals
declined to apply Roberts the following year in State v. Brigman.124 It
is too soon to determine Crawford's full implications. Like any new
legal standard, the holding in Crawford will be defined and shaped by
later court decisions.
As soon as the Supreme Court of North Carolina announced the
Miller II decision, attorneys began debating whether the holding in
Crawford would keep Willard's statement to Gammon out of the
courtroom in the State's prosecution of Kontz 25  Crawford's
application hinges on whether Willard's statement fits the definition
of a testimonial statement. Based on the limited description of the
term "testimonial" provided by the United States Supreme Court in
Crawford, Willard's statement does not seem to qualify. His
statement was not made in a formal legal context, and it is reasonable
to assume that he did not expect his private conversation with his
attorney to be used in the courtroom.
Defining Willard's statement as nontestimonial means Crawford
and its requirement that the accused receive an opportunity for prior
cross-examination of the declarant would not apply. However,
Willard's statement would still have to fall within a hearsay exception,
and possibly also meet the requirements of reliability set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Roberts, to be admissible. Neither of
these procedural hurdles, however, should pose a significant problem
to admitting the statement in court. The North Carolina Rules of
Evidence contain a catch-all exception to the hearsay rule.26 When
123. State v. Blackstock, 165 N.C. App. 50, 66 n.2, 598 S.E.2d 412, 422 n.2 (2004)
("Although Crawford overrules the Roberts framework to the extent that it applies to
testimonial statements, Roberts remains good law regarding nontestimonial statements."),
discretionary review denied, 610 S.E.2d 208 (N.C. 2005).
124. 615 S.E.2d 21 (N.C. App. 2005). The Brigman court found the declarant's
statement to be nontestimonial and held Crawford did not apply. Id. at 25. The court then
quoted Crawford as allowing states flexibility in the development of hearsay law, and
upheld the trial court's decision to admit the statements. Id. at 26. The court never
mentions Roberts. Interestingly, the author of the Blackstock opinion was on the panel
that decided Brigman and concurred with the result. Id. The Brigman court even cites to
the Blackstock decision as authority for its finding that the challenged statement is
nontestimonial. Id. at 25.
125. See Andrea Weigl, Secrets May Not Ever Go to Jury: Willard's Tale May Not Be
Admissible, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 13,2004, at B1.
126. See N.C. R. EVID. 803(24); see also id. R. 804(b)(5) (containing the same residual
exception as is found in Rule 803(24) but applying the exception to situations where the
declarant is unavailable). Rule 804(b)(5) is implicated in this situation, because Willard,
the declarant, is unavailable. However, there is no practical difference on these facts
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hearsay does not fit any of the specific statutory exceptions, a court
may nonetheless admit the statement, provided it has "equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," is offered as evidence
of material fact, is more probative than any other evidence, and "the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.'
127
A statement admitted under the catch-all exception should
likewise pass the test set forth in Roberts, assuming the Confrontation
Clause applies to nontestimonial statements. This conclusion is not
based on the belief that Willard's statement to Gammon is inherently
trustworthy. Indeed, one could argue that Willard may have lied
about his lack of involvement in Miller's death to protect his family
after his death by removing his name as a suspect. 28 Rather, this
conclusion stems from a belief that the court's past willingness to
amend the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege-a willingness
on display in Miller I-indicates the court's unexpressed desire to
ensure that Willard's statement is disclosed and used in the criminal
proceedings. The Roberts test and the application of the catch-all
hearsay exception are determined within a trial court's discretion. 29
It is therefore likely that the court will find the conditions proper for
admitting Willard's statement into evidence.
A careful study of the holding in Miller I is important because of
its potential impact on the everyday practice of North Carolina
attorneys. Does the outcome change the way attorneys conduct their
practice, or is the holding narrowly tailored to the facts of Miller I?
between the application of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), because both require the same
standard of trustworthiness before a court will admit the proffered hearsay.
127. Id. R. 804(b)(5). The catch-all exception would likely be implicated in this case
because it does not appear that Willard's statement meets the criteria of any of the other
hearsay exceptions. For example, Willard's statement is not a statement against interest,
see id. R. 804(3), because it does not expose Willard to criminal liability, see also Miller II,
358 N.C. 364, 369, 595 S.E.2d 120, 123 (2004) (agreeing with the trial court's conclusion
that disclosure would not subject Willard to criminal liability). For a detailed discussion of
the six-step inquiry a court must make before allowing evidence under the catch-all
exception, see State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 90-98, 337 S.E.2d 833, 843-48 (1985).
128. Criminal defense attorneys maintain that their clients are sometimes reluctant to
be completely honest in attorney-client conversations. See Weigl, supra note 125.
129. See N.C. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5) (stating that hearsay is admissible if a court
determines: (A) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) it is more probative than
any other evidence that can be procured through reasonable efforts; and (C) the purpose
of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice will be best served by admitting the
hearsay into evidence); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that a court must
find that a hearsay statement bears "adequate indicia of reliability" before admitting it);
Smith, 315 N.C. at 97, 337 S.E.2d at 847 (noting that admissibility of hearsay statements
under Rule 803(24) "is within the sound discretion of the court").
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The opinion makes it clear that any attorney-client communication
regarding a third party that does not expose the client to criminal or
civil liability is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. 130
Attorneys should be mindful of this exception and, if the situation
demands, should inform their clients of it. However, it is important to
note that comments relating to a third party that are defined out of
the attorney-client privilege by Miller I may still be privileged under
the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, meaning that
absent a court order, an attorney may not unilaterally decide to reveal
the contents of the communication. 3
It is less clear what impact the court's adoption of the Swidler
factors will have on the way attorneys in North Carolina practice.
Given the court's declaration in Miller II that "this very narrow
exception to the attorney-client privilege should be appropriately
limited both as to its scope and method of disclosure," future courts
will probably err on the side of safety and construe Miller I as
narrowly as possible.'32 It is therefore unlikely that future courts will
employ the Swidler inquiry in cases where the communication is
privileged under McIntosh unless the client is deceased and there is a
criminal investigation pending. Because it is unlikely that the Swidler
factors will be applied in situations distinguishable from the facts in
Miller I, the court's opinion in Miller I should have little to no impact
on the way attorneys in North Carolina practice. However, the fact
that the supreme court was willing to create the Swidler factors to
accommodate the rare facts of Miller I demonstrates that the next
unusual case may lead to application of the Swidler factors in other
contexts, further eroding the attorney-client privilege. If courts do
apply the Swidler factors in other contexts, they will likely do so only
after conducting an interests of justice balancing test to keep the
factors from becoming an all-purpose exception.'33
Finally, attorneys should recognize that when an attorney-client
communication is not privileged under either the McIntosh or the
Swidler tests, the communication will likely be admissible under the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence. While the definition of
130. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
133. The alternative would be a mechanical application of Swidler wherever disclosure
would tend not to harm the client's interests. This result would directly contravene the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's instruction that Miller I constitutes a narrow exception
to the attorney-client privilege. Note, however, that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
expressly held in Miller I and Miller H that such a balancing test should not be conducted.
See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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testimonial statements under Crawford is far from settled, attorney-
client communications will probably fall into the category of
nontestimonial hearsay. This will mean there is no requirement that
the declarant be unavailable and that the accused was granted an
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant in order for the statement
to be admissible. Even if the Roberts standard applies to
nontestimonial hearsay, a client's communication with an attorney
should fit within the particularized-guarantees-of-trustworthiness
exception to the hearsay rule.
Some will argue that Miller I is an example of the old adage that
hard facts make bad law,134 concluding that, in its efforts to ensure
that Willard's statement could be used to help convict Eric Miller's
murderer, the court wrongly eroded the sanctity of the attorney-client
privilege. It is difficult to find the correct balance between the
competing values of protecting the attorney-client privilege and the
right of the accused to confront witnesses against the public's interest
in convicting a murderer. Depending on how Miller I is interpreted
by future courts, the Supreme Court of North Carolina may have
achieved such a balance. The holding in Miller I should be narrowly
construed and applied only in cases with facts similar to the facts in
Miller I. If this course is followed, then Miller I will stand merely for
the proposition that in cases of extreme public need, and where
disclosure of a privileged statement would not harm the client, the
courts have the power to abrogate the attorney-client privilege. This
result appears to be a fair trade for the advantages such a rule will
have in future criminal investigations.
SARAH A. L. PHILLIPS
134. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[g]reat cases like hard cases make bad law" because they appeal "to the
feelings and distort[] the judgment").
1612 [Vol. 83
